WHILE it gets less attention than India or China, Poland has 
been one of the world’s great development success stories of the past 
two decades. This is due in no small part to the policies it pursued 
after the end of Communist rule. One of the architects of those 
policies, Leszek Balcerowicz, was the subject of 
a long interview in this weekend’s 
Wall Street Journal.
 The article is worth reading, although Mr Balcerowicz’s narrative of 
Poland’s success and its applicability to the beleaguered nations of the
 euro area leaves something to be desired.
If you want to 
understand why Poland had a good crisis, you need to understand three 
things. First, you need to know that Poland’s currency, the zloty, was 
never pegged to the euro. This was immensely helpful both on the upside 
and on the downside. From 2004-2008, credit sloshed into the new member 
states of the European Union from Western European banks. The biggest 
victims were those that borrowed in currencies they could not print: 
euros, Swiss francs, and Swedish kronor. Worst hit were the Baltics, 
which had rigidly pegged their currencies to the euro since the early 
2000s. Private credit doubled in those countries and all three endured 
punishing recessions afterwards.
Private credit growth was much 
slower in Poland, although it was still pretty rapid. Some of this was 
because of Poland’s history with corporate nonperforming loans from the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s. The IMF and World Bank wrote 
a paper
 about lending in Poland at the end of 2006 and came up with an 
additional explanation: Poland’s institutions were relatively unfriendly
 to creditors.
It is hard to say how much this mattered in the grand scheme of
 things, since European lenders were not exactly discriminating back 
then. In the absence of a currency peg, they were perfectly willing to 
make loans in zloty through their Polish subsidiaries. These inflows 
from the West caused the zloty to appreciate by more than 50% against 
the euro during the credit boom. While the strong currency made 
foreign-currency-denominated debt relatively more attractive to people 
who unwisely assumed that the zloty would continue to appreciate 
indefinitely, it may have dampened loan growth overall. The strong 
currency also provided flexibility to respond to a downturn.
Sure enough, when the crisis hit and Western European lenders started pulling their money out of Poland, the 
zloty lost more than a third of its value against the euro. (
Matt O'Brien
 highlighted this yesterday.) While it has appreciated somewhat since 
then, the zloty is still about one-fourth cheaper than it was in 
mid-2008. Since Poland’s private sector denominated most (but not all) 
of its debt in zloty, the devaluation was unambiguously stimulative. 
Between the middle of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, 
Poland’s trade balance
 swung from a deficit of more than €1.7 billion to a surplus of more 
than €100m. The trade balance returned to deficit as world trade 
rebounded, but at about €500m, it is now far smaller than it was. None 
of this was mentioned by Mr Balcerowicz.
Of course, the 
devaluation of the zloty would not have been sufficient to keep Poland 
out of recession had it not been for an act of flagrant government 
intervention into the private financial system: the 
Vienna Initiative.
 This is the second thing you need to know about to understand Poland’s 
post-2008 performance. In one of the wiser acts of European 
policymaking, the Vienna Initiative encouraged Western European lenders 
to maintain their exposures to Central and Eastern Europe. While it was 
not entirely successful, as the Bank for International Settlements noted
 in their most recent 
quarterly review, this programme definitely made a difference to nations like Poland. It was not mentioned by Mr Balcerowicz.
The last thing you need to understand about Poland is that it practised robustly 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
 During the boom years, its government budget deficit shrank from more 
than 6% of GDP to less than 2%. Then, in response to the downturn, the 
deficit ballooned to nearly 8% by 2011. The government 
explicitly rejected austerity
 and was the only nation on the European continent to avoid a recession.
 Again, Mr Balcerowicz does not mention this. In fact, he recommends 
cutting government spending during downturns because it will encourage 
private investment through the “confidence effect”.
Poland’s 
economic performance contains many interesting lessons for those who 
want to learn from it. But that requires examining all of the evidence, 
not just what is most convenient.
Courtesy : The Economist
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