WHILE it gets less attention than India or China, Poland has
been one of the world’s great development success stories of the past
two decades. This is due in no small part to the policies it pursued
after the end of Communist rule. One of the architects of those
policies, Leszek Balcerowicz, was the subject of
a long interview in this weekend’s
Wall Street Journal.
The article is worth reading, although Mr Balcerowicz’s narrative of
Poland’s success and its applicability to the beleaguered nations of the
euro area leaves something to be desired.
If you want to
understand why Poland had a good crisis, you need to understand three
things. First, you need to know that Poland’s currency, the zloty, was
never pegged to the euro. This was immensely helpful both on the upside
and on the downside. From 2004-2008, credit sloshed into the new member
states of the European Union from Western European banks. The biggest
victims were those that borrowed in currencies they could not print:
euros, Swiss francs, and Swedish kronor. Worst hit were the Baltics,
which had rigidly pegged their currencies to the euro since the early
2000s. Private credit doubled in those countries and all three endured
punishing recessions afterwards.
Private credit growth was much
slower in Poland, although it was still pretty rapid. Some of this was
because of Poland’s history with corporate nonperforming loans from the
late 1990s and the early 2000s. The IMF and World Bank wrote
a paper
about lending in Poland at the end of 2006 and came up with an
additional explanation: Poland’s institutions were relatively unfriendly
to creditors.
It is hard to say how much this mattered in the grand scheme of
things, since European lenders were not exactly discriminating back
then. In the absence of a currency peg, they were perfectly willing to
make loans in zloty through their Polish subsidiaries. These inflows
from the West caused the zloty to appreciate by more than 50% against
the euro during the credit boom. While the strong currency made
foreign-currency-denominated debt relatively more attractive to people
who unwisely assumed that the zloty would continue to appreciate
indefinitely, it may have dampened loan growth overall. The strong
currency also provided flexibility to respond to a downturn.
Sure enough, when the crisis hit and Western European lenders started pulling their money out of Poland, the
zloty lost more than a third of its value against the euro. (
Matt O'Brien
highlighted this yesterday.) While it has appreciated somewhat since
then, the zloty is still about one-fourth cheaper than it was in
mid-2008. Since Poland’s private sector denominated most (but not all)
of its debt in zloty, the devaluation was unambiguously stimulative.
Between the middle of 2008 and the beginning of 2009,
Poland’s trade balance
swung from a deficit of more than €1.7 billion to a surplus of more
than €100m. The trade balance returned to deficit as world trade
rebounded, but at about €500m, it is now far smaller than it was. None
of this was mentioned by Mr Balcerowicz.
Of course, the
devaluation of the zloty would not have been sufficient to keep Poland
out of recession had it not been for an act of flagrant government
intervention into the private financial system: the
Vienna Initiative.
This is the second thing you need to know about to understand Poland’s
post-2008 performance. In one of the wiser acts of European
policymaking, the Vienna Initiative encouraged Western European lenders
to maintain their exposures to Central and Eastern Europe. While it was
not entirely successful, as the Bank for International Settlements noted
in their most recent
quarterly review, this programme definitely made a difference to nations like Poland. It was not mentioned by Mr Balcerowicz.
The last thing you need to understand about Poland is that it practised robustly
counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
During the boom years, its government budget deficit shrank from more
than 6% of GDP to less than 2%. Then, in response to the downturn, the
deficit ballooned to nearly 8% by 2011. The government
explicitly rejected austerity
and was the only nation on the European continent to avoid a recession.
Again, Mr Balcerowicz does not mention this. In fact, he recommends
cutting government spending during downturns because it will encourage
private investment through the “confidence effect”.
Poland’s
economic performance contains many interesting lessons for those who
want to learn from it. But that requires examining all of the evidence,
not just what is most convenient.
Courtesy : The Economist
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